John Mann: The evidence on the use of concrete cushion road humps over the past 10 years is not very good. People can drive motor bikes between them, they fail to take into account on-street parking, and 4x4s can straddle them at great speed. Would the Minister care to come to Market Warsop in my constituency to road test the concrete road humps there?

Julia Goldsworthy: Has the Secretary of State assessed how many NHS bodies will be affected by the national recommendations contained in the report? How long will they take to implement? What proportion of those providing services for the learning disabled are currently not in compliance with the recommendations? What are the cost implications of the recommendations for NHS bodies and local authorities? Despite existing budgetary pressures, both Cornwall county council and the primary care trust are facing additional unanticipated expenditure of roughly £2 million each this financial year.
	In addition, will the Secretary of State please look again at the inspection system? The Healthcare Commission found terrible levels of abuse in its inquiry, but failed to pick up any of those problems in its two previous inspections of the trust, which covered the same period and which resulted in the trust being awarded three stars and two starts respectively. Does she agree that that points to failings in the inspection system that are not covered in the report's recommendations? They must be urgently addressed. How could the management failings go unnoticed in those inspections, and why was the widespread abuse and mismanagement not dealt with on those occasions? Although registering with CSCI will ensure that minimum standards are met in relation to homes and domiciliary care, without performance indicators, the treatment of adults with learning disabilities will not be integrated into the strategy—

Patricia Hewitt: The hon. Gentleman raises an important point about the distance that many people with learning disabilities live away from home. That is very much a matter for commissioners. As primary care trusts and social services authorities review services, in accordance with the White Paper principles, they should take that into account. In some cases, there might be good reasons why people are living a considerable distance from home—for instance, so that they can get the services that they need—but clearly being so far away from their home and family is likely to increase their vulnerability to poor services, or even abuse. I would expect commissioners to take that issue into account when considering whether more services need to be provided locally for this particular group of people.
	The hon. Gentleman asks about the exchange of data between agencies. I am aware that there are various difficulties in ensuring that the barriers to exchanging data are removed. I will write to him with further details of the progress that we are making on that point.
	The hon. Gentleman asks about health action plans for people with learning disabilities. I understand that some areas have put those in place for all people covered by the recommendation. However, that is not the case universally, and, again, it is something that commissioners and health providers need to consider.
	The hon. Gentleman referred to the recommendation about the supported living fund. I would add to that the work that we are already doing following the January White Paper on extending individual budgets and direct payments, which is already giving many adults with learning disabilities much more choice about, and control over, where they live, what kind of support services they have, and who provides those services. Those features were almost wholly absent from the experiences of the people in Cornwall. All those issues and others will be considered in more detail by the Under-Secretary of State for Health, my hon. Friend the Member for Bury, South, who will be leading a high-level group in the Department of Health to ensure that the recommendations are implemented and that we follow up to ensure that this does not happen again.

ENERGY REVIEW

Alistair Darling: If the Conservatives have problems with consensus within their party, so do the Liberals. I can only refer the hon. Gentleman to what his hon. Friend the Member for Twickenham (Dr. Cable), who is in his place, said:
	"Dogma about new nuclear power is unhelpful, for and against".
	One would not know that to listen to the Liberal spokesman today.
	In relation to renewable energy, I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for saying that he supports renewable electricity. In particular, he refers to renewable generation in the north of Scotland. Perhaps he will have a word with those Liberal Democrat Members who say that they are in favour of renewable energy and then object to wind farms when they are planned, and object to the power lines to take electricity from wind farms to where it is needed. If the Liberals are serious about those things, they must face up to the difficult and sometimes unpopular decisions, as well as the populist decisions that he set out.
	When the hon. Gentleman talked about distributed energy, he gave the distinct impression that he was against having a national grid. I am in favour of distributed energy, and I think that we could do a lot more in that regard. However, having a national grid and being able to draw on such energy sources across the country, whether gas or electricity, serves us well. Apart from that, I more than happy to work with him on achieving whatever consensus is left between us.
	The hon. Gentleman made points about wave and tidal power and mentioned the Severn barrage. In relation to the renewables obligation—which I believe is essential, although I am not sure what the Liberals' position is—I said in my statement that we want to consult on banding that in future, so that it encourages newer and emerging technology. I think that we can do an awful lot more as far as that is concerned.
	It is important that, when we consider our energy requirements, we have a mix of energy. I said to the hon. Gentleman that nuclear currently provides about 20 per cent. of electricity generation. If we do not do anything, that will decrease to 6 per cent., and the risk is that gas will be a bigger percentage, which would be deeply regrettable.
	I totally reject the argument that if we go for nuclear, nothing else will happen. I remind the hon. Gentleman that, under the renewables obligation, the renewables industry will get the equivalent of about £1 billion a year subsidy by 2010.

Peter Luff: I hope that the House will be given an early opportunity to debate the report at great length, as it relates to a very complex subject. In deference to your ruling, Mr. Speaker, I shall concentrate on one issue. Does the Secretary of State understand that while his analysis of value in carbon is very good, his policy conclusions are, I fear, inadequate? He clings to the climate change levy and complex climate change agreements, which do nothing for the long-term market-based costing of carbon emissions and he invests too much hope in the EU emissions trading scheme. I do not believe that he is creating the stable market for carbon that will bring forward investment in clean-coal technology, renewables or, indeed, new nuclear power stations.

TAX CREDITS

Dawn Primarolo: I assure my hon. Friend that I am not disheartened. Indeed, I am encouraged by the excellent communications that have been sent to me and to other hon. Members describing how tax credits have helped single parents and families. Tax credits also help the Government in our historic challenge of eradicating child poverty. At some point, the Opposition parties must decide whether they are to going to continue to oppose tax credits. If they are, what will they say to the tens of thousands of families in their constituencies who will lose hundreds of pounds a month?

Sally Keeble: I welcome the measures to tackle identity fraud announced this afternoon. I, too, am a member of the Treasury Committee, and I underline the fact that the report welcomes the way in which tax credits have targeted child poverty, and so it should. The system helps 9.9 million children, whereas the old family credit helped only 1.6 million children. In moving forward with the tax credit system, will my right hon. Friend make sure that the child care element is protected, because it allows women to go out work, which ultimately improves living standards for children in this country?

US-UK EXTRADITION TREATY

ACCIDENTS INVOLVING ANIMALS (STRICT LIABILITY)

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE (ANNUAL REPORT)

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Before I call the next speaker, I have to notify the House, in accordance with the Royal Assent Act 1967, that Her Majesty the Queen has signified her Royal Assent to the following Acts and Measures:
	Child Care Act 2006
	Electoral Administration Act 2006
	National Lottery Act 2006
	Leicester City Council Act 2006
	Liverpool City Council Act 2006
	Maidstone Borough Council Act 2006
	Church of England (Miscellaneous Provisions) Measure 2006
	Pastoral (Amendment) Measure 2006

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE (ANNUAL REPORT)

David Davis: I thank the Home Secretary for that extremely useful intervention. The examining magistrates model was proposed in the first instance by the Newton committee and we supported that argument as it appeared to be the most robust. I agree entirely that we should not take risks in that area, but on the basis of legal advice from outside the Government—as well as the Government's commentary—it appears to be achievable. People as eminent and knowledgeable about the issue as Lord Lloyd, for example, think that it is a tenable and achievable aim. I look forward to the Home Secretary returning to the House at some time soon with a conclusive answer on the issue.
	The Committee's report has a section on the Serious Organised Crime Agency. One of the aspects of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 that many criticised at the time of its passage was the absence of a single UK border police force. What Lord Stevens referred to as our "porous" borders have an impact on all the targets dealt with by the agencies covered by the Committee—organised crime, espionage and terrorism.
	The Committee reports that
	"the threat from espionage remains...Several countries are actively seeking British information and material to advance their own military, technological, political and economic programmes".
	For almost a century, foreign intelligence services have used large movements of people, especially refugees, as cover for inserting their agents. There is also the now well understood threat of foreign terrorists entering the country illegally.
	The failure of the Government to get a grip on illegal immigration, the now famous admission by the Immigration and Nationality Department's head of removals that he does not have the faintest idea how many illegal immigrants are in this country and the Home Secretary's description of the IND as "not fit for purpose" demonstrate a serious weakness in the Government's strategy to keep out those who would do this country harm. As the example of one of the suspects wanted in connection with the attempted bombing on 21 July last year showed, there are also problems monitoring people leaving the country. Despite his photograph being distributed to ports and airports, he was able to escape to Paris and then to Rome.
	If the Home Secretary is really serious about protecting our borders, he will look again at introducing a single border police force. The Metropolitan police have called for one, the former head of the Association of Chief Police Officers has called for one and the Home Affairs Committee called for one more than five years ago—but just a few weeks ago, the Prime Minister rejected those calls. If there were a single force, combining the expertise of existing agencies to prevent foreign terrorists entering the country or to detect suspects leaving the country, the burden on the security services would be lower in the first place.
	Yesterday, the Home Secretary announced in his statement that a Cabinet-level Committee would work on measures to reduce alienation. However, the ISC reports that another ministerial Committee, the Intelligence Services Committee, has met just once in the past 10 years. That raises a serious problem about ministerial oversight of national security. Currently, a vast array of individuals, bodies and committees are involved in protecting the security of this country, but no single Minister is charged solely with overseeing those bodies and countering the terrorist threat.
	By virtue of his wide range of responsibilities, the Home Secretary always has a lot on his plate, and he has admitted as much himself. Much of that work is urgent, as the recent crises over foreign prisoners and other matters have shown. It is impossible for him, or for anyone in his position, to focus entirely on security issues. That is perfectly reasonable, and it is why we have long proposed that a single, Cabinet-level Minister should focus solely on counter-terrorism and national security. I understand that that proposal now has the support of the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee.
	The Prime Minister has rejected our proposals again, saying that the present arrangements work well, yet the simple truth is that they do not work well, or not well enough. The speed of progress in the prevention and detection of terrorist attacks is slower than we would like. That is not a reflection on the Home Secretary or his predecessors; it is more a reflection on the system that is in place. Until we have a single Minister whose sole focus is defeating the terrorist threat, improvements to the security services and to our resilience arrangements will not be as rapid as they could and should be.
	I have paid tribute already to the excellent work of the ISC, under the leadership of the right hon. Member for Torfaen. With limited resources, it performs its task admirably, but no one could imagine that its report on the events of 7/7 could match the 550-page report produced by the 9/11 commission. The time has come for the powers and remit of the ISC to be expanded, to match its task's heightened profile and difficulty. By increasing the ISC's powers, Parliament could ensure full scrutiny of the work of the intelligence and security services while maintaining the necessary secrecy that surrounds their operations.
	I last asked the Home Secretary about these matters in May, when he responded that the ISC's scope, remit and statute were defined by the previous Conservative Government. That is correct, and I am touched that the right hon. Gentleman values that Government's actions so highly that he wants to maintain the status quo. However, I think that the Government accept that we now face a new and more sophisticated threat. It is only right that the ISC's role should develop to ensure that that threat is met in the most effective way possible.
	The ISC was created in the mid-1990s. It was envisaged then that, as the Committee acquired the confidence of the intelligence and security communities, it would evolve towards being a Select Committee of this House, rather than an appointed Committee of the Prime Minister. I urge the Home Secretary to consider those proposals, to ensure that our security services perform their vital role to the best of their ability and under the best possible scrutiny.

David Davis: If my hon. Friend will forgive me, I think that he is blaming the wrong person. We cannot blame the Committee for the extent to which the House or the Government take action on the basis of its recommendations. That is purely the responsibility of the House and the Government. The Committee does the best job it can within the limits of its remit and my hon. Friend highlights a good example of one of the things that it illustrated.
	The burden of the ISC's work this year has been the report into the London terrorist attacks of 7 July, about which I do not intend to go into great detail as I suspect that the story will change over the coming year. When the Committee published its report, I paid tribute to it as "extremely insightful", but although the Committee is impartial, astute and of the highest integrity, as I have said before, there are limitations on what it can achieve. I shall read a quotation to the House:
	"No one wants to play the blame game. No one wants an investigation to find one person who was at fault and make them pay. But we need to fully understand what happened on July 7. And there is a very simple reason - it is the best way to stop it from ever happening again. The public need to know if there was anything that could have been done immediately before the attacks to prevent them. They need to know whether there were things the police or security services might have done which could have saved all those lives."
	Those are the words not of some wild revolutionary, but of the right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham). So if the Home Secretary will not listen to me, perhaps he will listen to his right hon. Friend who, as the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee and a former Home Office Minister, has a good deal more experience in these matters than almost anybody else—even members of the Government.
	It is worth pointing out that almost every serious breach of security under previous Governments has resulted in an independent inquiry, generally led by a member of the judiciary, such as the Radcliffe inquiry in 1962, the Denning inquiry and the Franks inquiry. The least that the Government can do, to ensure that no stone is left unturned in learning the lessons from last July, is to order a full, independent inquiry. So far, the Home Secretary has shown himself willing to reconsider some of the decisions taken by his predecessors. I hope that this will be another issue on which he is prepared to be independently minded and to do what is best in the interests of the public.
	The ISC reports that the Home Secretary intends to toughen the Official Secrets Act. We hear that he intends to remove the common law defence of "duress of circumstance", or necessity, as a defence for so-called whistleblowers, and that the maximum penalty for breaching the Official Secrets Act could be doubled from two to four years in prison. I shall wait until the Bill is published and we have had a proper chance to examine it in detail before I comment on its contents and before the Opposition decide on their stance.
	It is surprising, however, that the Home Secretary wants to change the law when the Government have failed to test its operation in crucial cases, most recently in the case of Katharine Gun, which, I understand, led to the proposals. I should make it clear that I do not approve of what Ms Gun did, but if the Government believed that her actions represented a breach in security, or had endangered the interests of the United Kingdom, they had a duty to take the case to court in the national interest. However, the case was reportedly dropped just five hours after the defence sought the disclosure of the Attorney-General's advice to the Government about the Iraq war.
	Whether or not there is a public interest or similar defence in law, it is possible that a jury would still decide a case based on its own interpretation of the public interest. I hope that the Home Secretary will pay particular attention to this part of my argument, as that is an important test; for example, such an interpretation of the public interest may have been the reason for the acquittal of Clive Ponting, under a previous Government.
	The Government came to power with an admirable reputation and enthusiasm for freedom of information, for protecting whistleblowers and for civil rights—an apposite point given the issues that were raised with me earlier—which has, sadly, faded in recent years. The Government's behaviour towards legitimate—indeed, public spirited—whistleblowers has bordered on the disreputable. There will be a fear that the Official Secrets Act is being used to conceal embarrassing facts, rather than secrets that are essential to the security of the state. If the proposed measures represent the former, the whole House will resist them, but if they are really necessary for the defence of the state, they will receive our support. That distinction is vitally important.

Paul Murphy: Indeed. There are some advantages, then, in the Committee being transferred into a Select Committee.
	Let us look at the way in which the Committee is appointed. We know, of course, that the appointments are made by the Prime Minister. However, the members of the Opposition on the Committee—remember that out of nine members, four are members of the Opposition—are appointed on the recommendation of the leaders of their respective parties. To all intents and purposes, the appointment of the members is very similar to the appointment of Select Committee members. In addition, the way in which the Committee operates in its offices in Whitehall is exactly the same as the way in which Select Committees operate—by way of cross-examination and taking evidence, both written and oral.

Paul Murphy: I assume that my hon. Friend means me when he says "he". I do not make the selections. What I am telling the House is that the Prime Minister selects the Labour members on the basis on his own decision, having taken advice; other members are selected on the recommendation of the Leader of the Opposition and the leader of the Liberal Democrat party. That seems very similar to the way in which Select Committees are appointed.
	I do not want to go too far down this road, because, as I said, I am neutral on the issue of whether the Committee should be a Select Committee, in terms of the constitutional point, but I am certain that it ought to be a different type of Committee. It has to meet in private. It is clearly absurd for a Committee dealing with secret intelligence to meet in pubic. That cannot happen. Of course, we debate such matters—we are doing so today—in the Chamber of the House of Commons, and that is right, too. There are reports—at least one, usually two and sometimes three a year—from the Committee that are debated in public and that are in the public domain.
	It is also nonsense to suggest that the members of the Committee, in the words of some journalists, are the Prime Minister's stooges, or that we have a cosy relationship with the security services. How on earth can that be the case with a Committee that is drawn up on lines that give the Government a majority of only one—if that were ever to be used, which it is not—and that includes among its members a former deputy leader of the Conservative party and a former deputy leader of the Liberal Democrat party? As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary indicated in his speech, by no stretch of the imagination could it be said that they are the Prime Minister's stooges.
	The accusation that the Committee is amateur and inexperienced is also clearly nonsense. Of the nine members of the Committee, one of whom comes from the House of Lords, four have been Ministers in Departments that have direct knowledge of and relationships with the security services. In terms of experience, although they might not want me to mention it, my colleagues and I have a combined service to Parliament of nearly 200 years. That is nearly 200 years of valuable experience.
	The point that I am trying to make to the House is that in no way is the Committee full of people who are there to give the Government a soft line or some sort of easy ride. That is not the purpose of the Committee. The purpose of the Committee is to scrutinise the intelligence services as effectively as it can, without fear and without favour. That is not an issue that divides us. All of us on the Committee, from whatever party and whichever House in this Parliament of ours, believe that that is the right thing to do.
	For example, in the annual report for 2005-06, which we are considering, there are three substantial criticisms that we believe should be dealt with. Some of them were touched on by the shadow Home Secretary. There is the fact that the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the security and intelligence co-ordinator ought not to be the same person. We are still unconvinced that that is the right thing to have happened. We also say that the emphasis by the Joint Intelligence Committee on trying to achieve a consensus in its reports could mean that it is missing, or failing to prioritise, key points. We had concerns about the new intelligence system, SCOPE, and the difficulties that GCHQ had with various staff disputes.
	At the same time, however, we are also very conscious of the fact that, where praise is appropriate, we give it to the intelligence services. That is something that any Select Committee in the House of Commons would do. For example, the staff problems at GCHQ seem to be in the process of being resolved and the IT project SCOPE will deliver next year. There is no question but that the agencies have faced a huge challenge during the past 12 months, given all the difficulties with regard to the problems of counter-terrorism and 7 July, and I think that they have met that challenge.
	There is now an opportunity for dissent and challenge in the Defence Intelligence Staff—an essential recommendation of the Butler review. We recognise that extra funding has gone into the agencies and we have emphasised on more than one occasion the need to ensure that there is good value for money. There is another issue that is completely misunderstood by so-called commentators. That point came out last night on "Newsnight". I am talking about how people are recruited into our intelligence agencies. I understand that one of the so-called experts said that it was done by means of an Oxford don and a bottle of sherry. I have nothing against the University of Oxford—I went there myself—and I certainly have nothing against a bottle of sherry, but these days that is not the way in which people are recruited to our security and intelligence agencies. If Members had looked at  The Times some months ago, they would have seen that it contained advertisements for MI6. If they turn on their computers and look at the websites of both our security services, they will see that jobs are being advertised in public in a way that is completely different from what has gone on in the past. It is right for the Committee, Parliament and the Government to put right such misconceptions. It was good that our campaign to see BBC monitoring continue was successful, and we commend the lead that the agencies are taking on European co-operation.
	It is fair to say that much of the Intelligence and Security Committee's work this year was concentrated on the appalling events of July last year. Obviously, this debate is taking place in the context of the anniversary of that dreadful occasion. We found that there was no prior warning of the attack and no culpable failure on the part of the agencies. We found that MI5 had come across two of the leading bombers before the attacks at the periphery of an earlier investigation, but that there was no evidence that they were planning attacks against our country.

Nicholas Clegg: I used the powerful example of the report on the death of Zahid Mubarek, which was published after two earlier investigations, to point out that its recommendations were made after it was claimed that all the lessons had been learned and all the information had been uncovered. I do not know the unknowable but, given the enormity of the 7 July attacks, I do not understand why the hon. Lady and others are reluctant to make a comparatively modest investment in an independent inquiry, which might uncover facts of which we have no knowledge at present.
	As for the ISC report, I welcome the wording on the regionalisation of the operation of the security and intelligence services, and the fact that the process of regionalisation was accelerated following the July bombings. I was struck by the passage in paragraph 40 which states:
	"A vital part of the regionalisation programme will be the Service's ability to work closely with local bodies, particularly the Regional Intelligence Cells within the police."
	I am surprised that the process of regionalisation does not appear to have happened earlier. It is arguable that excessive centralisation is as unwelcome in this matter as it is in so many other areas of Government policy.
	It is consistent with the observation made in the Intelligence and Security Committee's earlier report of the 7 July bombings that the regionalisation of the security and intelligence services helps improve policing at local level and helps the front-line intelligence-gathering function of our police forces. That takes on particular resonance in the week when the Government's ill-judged attempt to force through police force mergers seems to have hit the buffers. I note that the Home Secretary's predecessor today branded that development as weak and damaging, but I come to the Home Secretary's defence, even in his absence. It is a welcome wake-up call that the move towards forced regional police mergers was the wrong way to go. The report helps to emphasise the need to localise both the police and the work of the intelligence services.
	There was reference earlier to the Committee's observations on the SCOPE IT system and the serious delays in rolling it out, from April 2005 to autumn 2006, yet the capital cost of that delay has been blanked out in the report. I find it difficult to understand why that cost should not be quantified in the report. I understand entirely that there is plenty of delicate and sensitive information that one does not want to appear in such reports, but I wonder whether there is a security risk in revealing the figure. I do not understand why the security services appear to have sought not to release the costs incurred by yet another delay in a public information technology project.
	That is particularly apposite hot on the heels of the revelations in the Sunday newspapers, notwithstanding the Home Secretary's confirmation this evening that he wants to press ahead with the development of the much more ambitious and complex ID card database, that there are pronounced reservations among senior officials about whether that is possible. One official was quoted in the Sunday papers as stating:
	"Nobody expects this programme to work. It is basically on hold while ministers rethink their options. It's impossible to imagine the full scheme being brought in before 2026."
	Another official remarked:
	"I conclude that we are setting ourselves up to fail",
	and yet another referred to the possibility that the scheme could be
	"canned completely".
	The fact that there is so much that we do not know about the feasibility of implementing the ID card database affirms the need for much more detail about why the SCOPE IT system has been delayed and the cost that that delay has incurred.
	The report contains an important section on the work of the Serious Organised Crime Agency, and states that the Committee was told about the difficulties that could arise from the fact that SOCA will be competing with other agencies for new recruits. The Committee is to continue to examine progress and assess the effectiveness of co-operation between SOCA, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs and other agencies.
	I endorse the Committee's observations that competition for resources between SOCA and other agencies needs to be kept under review. Vigilance is required to ensure the best possible operational relationship between SOCA and HMRC in pursuing serious drug investigations and criminal finance work, which are the two responsibilities that have been transferred from HMRC to SOCA.
	However, there is a quasi-constitutional issue on which the report is silent, and which perhaps lies beyond the remit of the Committee—the apparent lack of direct accountability for the work of SOCA to the House. I urge the Home Secretary and his colleagues on the Front Bench to look once again at improving in any way that they can the transparency of the important and sensitive work of SOCA and the way in which the agency can be held accountable to the House.
	Finally, in an important section of the report there is reference to the fact that the Home Secretary
	"told the Committee that he had commissioned a study into the impact of new technology on interception, including any evidential issues, and that the Committee would have early sight of its findings."
	Although, as I understand it, the study exists, it is a pity that the Committee has not been given early sight of it. We on the Liberal Democrat Benches look forward with some eagerness to hearing the results of the study, because for some time we have argued, as have many others, that the permissibility of intercept evidence in our courts would be an important additional weapon in the fight against terrorism.
	Earlier this year the senior anti-terror police officer at the Met, Andy Hayman, advocated the use of intercept evidence in terrorist cases. As we know, in 2004 the Newton committee proposed the removal of the bar on intercept evidence as a more "acceptable and sustainable" approach to the threat from terrorism than the arrogation of new executive powers to restrict liberty outside the normal operation of the judicial process.
	We are in a rather anomalous position. According to Liberty, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland are the only countries worldwide that maintain a ban on the use of intercept evidence, yet we accept intercept evidence if that has been gained under the jurisdiction of other Governments. It seems odd that it is not permissible if it has been gained under our own authorisation, but is allowed if it has been obtained under the authorisation of Governments overseas. I hope the Home Secretary will use the study mentioned in the report as a launch-pad to have the debate once again. It has been rumbling on for a long time. I accept that there are a number of practical and legal difficulties, many of which we believe can be overcome.
	Like all good reports, the ISC report raises as many queries as it poses solutions—queries related to intercept evidence; the merits or otherwise of an independent inquiry into the events leading up to the bombings of 7 July; the importance of the further regionalisation and localisation of the operation of our security and intelligence services; the need to keep a vigilant eye on how the flaws, delays and unquantified costs of delayed IT systems can be remedied; and accountability for the operation of SOCA and other agencies. I repeat my gratitude to all members of the Committee for laying the report before us today.

Malcolm Rifkind: The hon. Gentleman is right. For five years, as Defence Secretary and then as Foreign Secretary, I saw such raw material. I saw the reports that came to me every day during that period. They were invariably accompanied by health warnings, not only because the information might be inaccurate, but because the person providing the information was sometimes being paid for it. Sometimes the informant was a defector from a regime who had his own agenda and wanted to spread information for his own reasons. Intelligence agencies understand that. However, I condemn the Government for not spelling out those matters to the nation when the media, perhaps inadvertently, misrepresented the JIC document.
	Although the Butler review did much good work, it failed the country in its comments on the matters that I have considered. However, I am saddened that the Committee, which in every other respect I greatly admire, has not taken as robust a position as it might have done, unless if I have missed something—doubtless, I shall be corrected if I have—in protecting the interests of Parliament and the nation when the intelligence agencies operate in such a fashion. Many hon. Members of all parties wish the Intelligence and Security Committee to be given a greater role, but it must be willing to condemn in no uncertain terms the use of intelligence agencies in a politicised fashion, whichever party is in power.
	I hope that the Minister will comment on that, but I hope even more that lessons have been learned and that such mistakes will not be repeated.

Gavin Strang: The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) will understand if I resist the temptation to comment on his remarks. Suffice it to say that I had the privilege of serving on the Intelligence and Security Committee when we thoroughly considered the matter that he raised. His contributions are always valuable and reflect his huge experience as a former Defence Secretary and Foreign Secretary, as he reminded us this evening.
	I had the privilege of serving on the Committee in the previous Parliament, from 2001 to 2005. It was different from its predecessor, with a new Chairman and new members comprising more than half the Committee. The same occurred again, with the appointment of a new Chairman and half the Committee being made up of new members. That is good and means that the Committee brings a fresh look to the issues. One of the things that struck me when reading the report was the extent to which it referred to issues in last year's report, which we worked hard to complete before the election. It is a matter of some regret to me that that report has never been debated; it should have been.
	The previous Committee was appointed just before 9/11, and the whole area of intelligence and security was transformed following those atrocities in the United States in 2001. Sadly, many of the developments in international affairs since then have served to fuel rather than dampen the rise of international terrorism. It is surely not controversial, for example, to suggest that Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib will have worked for our enemies in the global battle to win hearts and minds away from terrorism.
	With the increased threat of international terrorism, it quickly became apparent to the Committee on which I served, and to the Government, that there was an important need to increase the resources available to our intelligence agencies, and I pay tribute to the increases that have now taken place. The total funding for the agencies in 2000-01 was £862 million. The total budget this year is £1,568 million. The Government's response to the Committee's report refers to the £1 billion covering a rather wider area of security and intelligence, increasing to £2 billion. I am sure that the whole House will support those increases.
	It is one thing to increase the money available; however, the important thing is to ensure that that money is put to good use. The most important aspect of that is the increase in staffing that arose from the increased expenditure. Indeed, staff numbers at the Security Service are expected to rise about by 50 per cent. in the next three years, representing a substantial increase in addition to what has already taken place. As hon. Members have already mentioned, the Secret Intelligence Service has launched a website in the past year to aid recruitment, and it began advertising publicly for the first time in the press in May. The success of these recruitment procedures will not really become clear for at least four or five years, however, and we will not know until then whether the quality of the staff recruited will be up to the very important tasks for which they have responsibility.
	I was interested to see in the Committee's report that one of the roles of the professional head of intelligence analysis, put in place in the course of the last year, is to lead the cross-community work that is now under way to enhance the use of open source material alongside other sources. Of course, a key provider of open source information from around the world to the Government is BBC Monitoring. The Committee of which I was a member was tremendously impressed by the work of BBC Monitoring and by the potential for its future contribution. In successive reports, we expressed our concern at what was happening to BBC Monitoring, and I initiated a debate on the subject in the House of Commons on 23 March 2004.
	In the recent report, the Committee succinctly sets out the details of two to three years of unnecessary financial turmoil. The Committee is tactful, but essentially the Foreign and Commonwealth Office unilaterally reduced its contribution from £7.1 million to £3.1 million, and BBC Monitoring has now been transferred to the Cabinet Office as its sponsoring Department. I should like to put on the record that the stance taken by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office towards BBC Monitoring was deeply disappointing, and that it is a matter of regret that the FCO could no longer be entrusted with this tremendous national asset. It is my sincere hope that the new Foreign Secretary will recognise the importance of BBC Monitoring, particularly in the context of two of the major issues facing her Department and the people of this country: the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the increased threat from international terrorism.
	All those who worked on behalf of BBC Monitoring deserve credit for the fact that the present situation is not as bad as it could have been. Other contributing Departments are making up some of the financial gap left by the FCO, and funding this year has increased slightly to £24.6 million, although it is set to fall again in 2008-09 to £23.4 million. However, while the situation is not as bad as it could have been, it is not as good as it should be. If we consider the significant and welcome increases in funding to the agencies in recognition of the increased threat that we face, and if we consider the enhanced recognition of the importance of open source material to the work of the Government and their agencies, it is my view that we should also be seeing a growth in the resources and the work of BBC Monitoring. Instead, the funding shortfall will mean the closure of 69 posts. I realise that not all of those posts are currently filled, but I suggest that these cuts are taking us in the wrong direction. That does not strike me as a sign that we are looking after this asset entirely in the way we should be.
	I am pleased that the ISC has made a commitment to continue to monitor the arrangements for this important service, and I trust that Ministers will recognise the case for increasing the resources available to BBC Monitoring in the years to come, to reflect the increasing importance of the service and the growing demands placed upon it.
	The report is a little bit soft in its attitude towards the Ministerial Committee on Intelligence Services, known as the CSI. The Committee on which I served took the view that the CSI should meet regularly, although not necessarily every week or month. The report points out that Ministers consider issues such as Afghanistan in different Committees and are properly briefed by the agencies, and I do not doubt that. Nevertheless, we were convinced that there was a case for regular, if not frequent, meetings. We were particularly impressed by the equivalent arrangements that we saw in Australia.
	I am pleased to say that I can pay tribute to the Government for their decision on the Wilson doctrine. I do not think that anyone in the Chamber was in the House in 1966 when Harold Wilson set out his doctrine, although I had the privilege of serving in his Government subsequently. The doctrine stated that there would be no interception of telephones belonging to Members of Parliament. As the House will know, the interception of communications commissioner recommended, on the basis of the new regulatory powers that came into operation in 2000, that that undertaking should be abandoned, and the Prime Minister gave due consideration to that recommendation, as he was duty bound to do. I congratulate him—and the Committee on the role that it played in this—on the fact that that proposal has been abandoned. There is no question of the Wilson doctrine being changed and Members telephones will not be intercepted by the Government of the day.

David Tredinnick: When this Committee was first mooted many years ago, I had grave reservations about it. I thought that it would be dangerous and damaging to the security services. Having read this report thoroughly and looked at the others, however, I now have to say that the Committee has made a major contribution. It has acted responsibly in carrying out its remit, and we should be grateful to it and to the right hon. Member for Torfaen (Mr. Murphy) for their work. Having said that, I have real worries about certain aspects of the report, including its structure. If I have time, I also want to talk about the costs involved.
	I should perhaps declare an interest. I have had some dealings with terrorism in the past, and with the agencies of our enemies—principally the KGB, for reasons that I will explain in a moment. I served in Northern Ireland, where it was pretty clear who the enemy was: it was the IRA. I also served with the British Army of the Rhine in Berlin, defending the border there. The enemy there was pretty clear: it was the Russians and the KGB. We used to go round the Soviet sector in British military mission cars, and the KGB used to come over to our sector in their spy cars. There were pretty clearly drawn lines about who could do what.
	I was a little involved in 9/11, in that I was in New York just after the event. Driving into the city, where I had worked many years ago, the orange horizon and the missing buildings made an indelible impression on me. I was staying in mid-town, and I remember the awful smell and the roar of the emergency vehicles and rubble trucks as they drove up and down at night. I had not realised how badly all that had affected me until I tried to make a speech about it to the Market Bosworth Rotary club. I found my eyes filling with tears, and I could not continue with my speech.
	Later, in the spring of 2004, I was involved in the launch of the British Memorial Garden Trust UK Ltd, a charity formed to support the building of the memorial garden to the 67 British victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which is currently being built in New York. The launch took place in this House, appropriately, I think, in the Churchill room. Although I am no longer involved in the project, I would ask that the House recognise that a small number of people, on both sides of the Atlantic, have worked extremely hard to complete the garden, due in the spring of next year, and to raise the necessary funding of several million pounds. I am sure that I speak for the whole House in extending to them our wholehearted support and best wishes.
	The report has several main thrusts. One of them is the efficiency and effectiveness of the security services, and the Committee has done a lot to improve the mechanism for working by following its remit of examining policy administration and expenditure. The agencies are also much more accountable now, certainly in relation to the use of resources. Reading between the lines, it must be said that financial management was not a big part of the work of the agencies in the past. Methods of redress of grievances, which were addressed by Butler and taken up by the Committee, have also been important.
	If I may say so to the right hon. Member for Torfaen, the structure of the report is quite complicated. Obviously, there are the three main agencies, but many other subsections are listed, and it is sometimes hard to see how they tie in. I very much approve of the Committee's attempt to try to find common ground between the agencies, to reduce duplication and costs. I echo the concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Wirral, South (Ben Chapman) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) about the combining of the posts of Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator and Joint Intelligence Committee Chairman. Reading the report, I got the feeling that the Committee was deeply uneasy about that—that it had taken advice and agreed to it, but was not too happy about it. I hope that the right hon. Member for Torfaen goes back and looks at that, and does not just accept it as read.
	Another aspect of the report that alarmed me was the paragraph on the ministerial committee. From memory, the Intelligence and Security Committee remarked that the Ministerial Committee on the Intelligence Services had met only once in the last 10 years. What is going on? The ISC report qualifies that by saying, "It's all right, guys and girls, because they talk to each other elsewhere." That completely misses the point. The whole point of that committee is for Ministers of State and Under-Secretaries, not Cabinet Ministers, to get round a table, come up with some ideas and understand the real worries. Paragraph 76, on page 22, makes it clear that Ministers across Government need to have a clear understanding of intelligence. If the Minister for the Middle East is listening—I hope so, as we have talked and listened to each other over the years—I ask him to consider that, as it is a real concern. The report states:
	"We recommend that there should be a requirement for newly appointed Ministers and officials in key posts to familiarise themselves".
	Yes, there should be.
	Another concern, which has not been mentioned, is that the occupancy of the new GCHQ building is up by 25 per cent. The building must be bursting at the seams. What is happening about that unexpected increase in manpower and personnel, which has completely thrown the planning process? I hope that the Committee considers that.
	As for the clarity of the report, I was not really happy with its structure. According to the index, "The Intelligence Community" is dealt with on pages 5 to 11, and "The Agencies" on pages 11 to 21. Surely the agencies are part of the intelligence community. What is the purpose of that division? In the previous two Parliaments, I was the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and of the Statutory Instruments Committee, and one of the issues that we considered was how to achieve clarity in reports. If ever a report needed lines, diagrams and boxes to explain the different relationships, it is this one. In particular, on the role of the intelligence staff, I thought that sub-headings to make it clear that not everyone reports to SIC would be helpful.
	Acronyms are another issue. The report mentions SCOPE, which is not an acronym for anything, but it does not say what it means—it does not say that it is an IT intelligence system. Paragraph 75, on page 22, contains the following quote:
	"I have regular meetings with C"
	I wondered who "C" was. I thought that it must be short for CDI. Then I realised that it was CDI who had the regular meetings with C. I therefore turned back to the page of acronyms—there are 43, so it took me a few minutes to read—and C is not listed. Next time, can we manage to include C and SCOPE?
	The antiquated terminology of commissioners is another issue. We have the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and, apparently, we also have commissioners in the security services. Those who have been in the House a while know that there are also Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, which is a code name for the senior Whips who sign all the Government cheques. When they are not beating Members over the head, they go back and sign Government cheques for £20 million. I do not like that terminology; it is misleading, and we should change it. We should call them directors, monitoring officers or ombudsmen.
	Nowhere in the report is MI5 or MI6 mentioned—it is like an alien culture. The Home Secretary mentions it, my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East (Mr. Ellwood) mentioned it, everyone uses it; it is common terminology. The report should say that the Security Service is commonly known as MI5 and that the Secret Intelligence Service is commonly known as MI6, so that it is more readable.
	In 1968, I was asked to take over the British Atlantic group of young politicians. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington and Chelsea, the Minister for the Middle East and the right hon. Member for Torfaen came with me, and we paid visits to Canada, America and so on. We then turned the whole group to face east, and took delegations to the east. Douglas Hurd, who was then Foreign Secretary, agreed to speak at a conference where there were 100 young MPs. I asked him whether we could use Lancaster house, because had had given it to me on another occasion. I went to Brussels on a SHAPE visit and sat next to a Russian chap in the bar. I said that I had a brief to find young politicians in Russia and bring them over here. I said that that was what the Foreign Office wanted and he said exactly what I wanted, "I am a KGB man and a spy, and I will help you out". That was great; we had a good arrangement.
	The point is that east Europe has changed and a lot of our old enemies are now friends. There is a whole diaspora of spies out there and I suspect that they are available at a very cheap price. I hope that the right hon. Member for Torfaen is looking into ways of getting our former enemies to work for us. I believe that he has done a great job with the report, which takes our intelligence services forward in the right direction. One or two issues need to be addressed, but I welcome what has taken place.

Mike Gapes: Speaking as an MP with a large number of British Indian constituents, many of whom will have relatives living in Mumbai and its surrounding areas, may I begin by expressing my absolute horror and disgust at today's terrorist bombings. I hope that none of my constituents has relatives involved in the tragedy. My sympathy and commiserations go to all those affected. It is yet another outrage, occurring during a week in which the man responsible for the Beslan murders in Russia has been killed. We can also think of other terrorist events and outrages all over the world.
	As the report produced by the Committee chaired by my long-standing and right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Mr. Murphy) pointed out, there is a serious and sustained threat from international terrorism to the UK and its interests overseas, the most significant being from al-Qaeda and associated networks. The Foreign Affairs Committee drew a similar conclusion in our report, "The Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism", published just a few days ago on 2 July.
	The Intelligence and Security Committee states in its report:
	"There is increasing international tension over Iran's nuclear programme and backing of groups such as the Lebanese Hezbollah. There is a possibility of an increased threat to UK interests from Iranian state-sponsored terrorism should the diplomatic situation deteriorate."
	Similarly, our Select Committee drew attention to the potential difficulties of moving towards either sanctions or military action. We also noted that the Iranian regime could respond in certain ways, including asymmetrically. The ISC report refers to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as another potential danger to the UK's security and, once again, the Foreign Affairs Committee report strongly concurs. All three conclusions of the ISC echo the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
	Interestingly, there is another echo, which I find apposite. The ISC notes that the Secret Intelligence Service
	"has started to implement a policy of requiring senior managers to obtain relevant professional skills, and holders of key posts within corporate services will be expected to attain professional qualifications. The Service considers these structural and training changes essential to improve operational focus, to enable more efficient management of resources, and to meet the challenge of planned growth."
	The Foreign Affairs Committee has been calling on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—though possibly with less success than the ISC—for some considerable time to ensure that its senior managers have appropriate professional skills. If the Secret Intelligence Service can do it, surely the diplomatic service can.
	I also concur with my right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, East (Dr. Strang), who referred to the budget for BBC Monitoring. Our Select Committee had concerns about the changes and the budget reduction, so I am pleased that the ISC has welcomed the fact that other stakeholders have made up the shortfall and come forward to ensure that the vital work of BBC Monitoring is continued for a planned period for the future. It was a matter of great concern to the Foreign Affairs Committee in the last Parliament, and we are pleased that a solution has been found in the short term.
	I want to point to one area where I am concerned about the ISC report. It relates to the following narrow and limited statement:
	"The Committee is currently looking into the issue of rendition and will report in due course."
	I raise that matter because for almost a year in the present Parliament and about six months in the last Parliament—going back to February 2005—the Foreign Affairs Committee has been putting questions about extraordinary rendition to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. We had the frustrating experience of being told that we were not being given that information because it was going to the ISC.
	I was therefore interested—perhaps my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen can correct me—that he said, I thought, that ISC was about to begin an inquiry into this matter. We have been told by the Foreign Office for 18 months that, in fact, we were not being given the information because the ISC was carrying out that inquiry. I should be grateful for some clarification.
	I want to be fair to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In our latest report, on the information that we have discovered from different sources, including from a more open approach from the FCO more recently, we concluded that there was no hard evidence of the truth of any of those allegations, but that is based on the limited information given to us, having been told that intelligence information would not be given to us, even on a confidential basis, because it was being given to another Committee.
	I hope therefore that, when my right hon. Friend's Committee comes to a conclusion on this matter, he will be able to report to the House that he has got to the bottom of it and found out all the facts of the matter, because the Foreign Affairs Committee cannot say, on the limited information that we have been given, that we have done so, even though we have found no hard evidence. I should be grateful to the Minister if he took up that point when he responds to the debate.
	I drew attention to another concern in my intervention on the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis). When the ISC was established in 1994 by the then Conservative Government, it was not a Committee of the House and its secretariat was based in the Cabinet Office. Its Chairman, despite his estimable qualities, does not sit on the Liaison Committee, for example, because he has a particular role. I believe that the time has come for the House to revisit that issue. In fact, the Foreign Affairs Committee produced a special report in March 2004, in which we said that the House should consider the following questions:
	"What should be the status of the Intelligence and Security Committee? What principles and procedures should govern relations between the Intelligence and Security Services and Committees of this House?"
	We received information from the former Foreign Secretary, the Leader of the House of Commons, my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr. Straw), who told us that
	"Parliament has decided that the ISC is the appropriate body to see intelligence."
	That is not satisfactory, and I should be interested if the Minister could tell me when he responds to the debate where in the proceedings on the 1994 Bill or in the Intelligence Services Act 1994 itself there is a statement that specifically supports that assertion.
	Committees of the House, appointed by Members, in confidence and subject to various qualifications, should have the right to have access to intelligence material and should not be deprived of that access on the basis of a catch-all, whereby things are pushed off to the ISC, however good and estimable its members and however fine their recommendations, because that Committee is not accountable to us as Members, even though we are having the debate today. That Committee reports to the Prime Minister; it does not report to the House of Commons. I believe that that fundamental issue relates not just to the Foreign Affairs Committee, but to other Select Committees, and I hope that we can revisit it and that the House of Commons itself can consider the way forward in the future.

Andrew MacKinlay: It relates to the issue of selection for service on the committee. Indeed, it goes to the heart of the matter, because my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen mentioned advisers. We do not know their names, but my concern is that they are privy to false statements about hon. Members. Presumably, such statements are forwarded to the security and intelligence services. The comment about me had been on a file since 2003 and I got to know about it only by accident.
	Reference has been made to the Data Protection Act 1998. I put in an application under the Act and found that there were vexatious, mendacious and malicious comments about me in various documents. Those comments would have disqualified me from consideration by the Prime Minister for membership of the committee. It is, therefore, not a parliamentary Committee. Under the Select Committee system, one can apply, through one's party, and be accepted or rejected. One cannot apply to sit on the Intelligence and Security Committee. A Prime Minister might decide that someone is worth considering, and their name will be submitted for the scrutiny of people whose names we do not know. The candidate could be vetoed for reasons that neither he nor anyone else are aware of. That is the danger and that is the relevance of my personal experience to the constitutional position of this flawed and unparliamentary committee.
	With the greatest respect to my colleagues on the committee, we do not know how it works. We do not know how it selects areas for inquiry. We did not know until this evening even who the committee's clerk was. My hon. Friend the right hon. Member for Torfaen told us the name, which before tonight was always considered highly secret information. The ridiculous secrecy surrounding the ISC diminishes any confidence that I as a parliamentarian might have in its ability to probe adequately the conduct, competence and management abilities of the people who run our security and intelligence services.
	I think that the ISC is seriously flawed. I hope, Madam Deputy Speaker, that you will look at the  Official Report tomorrow, and that you will consider that the matters that I am raising to be absolutely valid, as they go to the heart of the selection process for the ISC. To whom is the committee accountable? It is a very serious matter if files on Members of Parliament are kept, without their knowing about it, by departmental officials. We find out about such files only when we stumble across them by accident. In some cases, they contain information about who our interlocutors are, and who would seek to gain our ear.
	I turn now to the Wilson doctrine, which is covered in paragraphs 26 to 28 of the ISC report. I wish that the Home Secretary were in his place, as it is rare for me to compliment him, but it is to his credit that he made it clear that he did not support a proposal to end the Wilson doctrine. Nevertheless, that doctrine is wholly inadequate when it comes to protecting the rights of Members of Parliament. However, what we have we need to hold. As I understand it, the doctrine deals with old-fashioned landline telephones, and does not take account of computer technology or the fact that equipment is so sophisticated now that eavesdropping can be carried out at great distances.
	I am not confident that people who do not have ministerial authority are not probing the communications of Members of Parliament. I am not making this up: my observations are based on my own painful experience of discovering comments about me in files that should not have contained them. The Executive branch of Government must assure every Member of Parliament that they are not subject to surveillance, and that no undue probing of their technologies is being carried out.
	If we had more insight into how the ISC selects its work, we might have greater confidence in it and be able to suggest areas of inquiry. I am especially concerned about one matter that in the past has caused laughter in the House, although I do not know why. I discovered, through a disclosure under the Data Protection Act 1998, that 13 officials—from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the intelligence community—met on 13 January for what was described as a "handling strategy" meeting about parliamentary questions that I had submitted in relation to Project Coast.
	When I questioned the relevant Minister about the matter, he said at the Dispatch Box that there was nothing in it at all, but I disagree. Information from court cases and South Africa's Truth and Justice Commission has revealed that a person equivalent to Dr. Mengele was working—

Caroline Flint: I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, West (Jim Dowd) for securing this debate, which comes at an important moment, as this issue breaks into the public consciousness. There is a certain rivalry and competition between retailers and food manufacturers in respect of labelling, which is healthy. I also welcome the presence this evening of the hon. Member for Southend, West (Mr. Amess), and thank him and my hon. Friend for their contributions to the Health Committee's report on obesity. That report provided not only the Department of Health but all of us in government who are working to tackle the issues associated with obesity with clarity in terms of the way ahead, and with the purpose and support to enable us to move forward.
	I have spent considerable time during the past year having joint meetings with the Food Standards Agency and different industry stakeholders on this issue. At some of those meetings, I have had various products put on the desk in front of me and have been told that the FSA's proposed model will be a nightmare for all concerned in the industry. Interestingly, a year ago, the argument was whether to have front-of-pack labelling to define products that are high in salt, fat and sugar.
	Things are different now. Although there is still some progress to be made in the proper labelling of packs, there has been a shift in understanding of the scientific reasons for the need to tackle obesity and of the health needs of the community, partly because of the public pressure that has been exerted. That pressure has been enhanced by Members of Parliament who have raised the issue on a number of occasions, stressing its importance as a piece of the jigsaw of work that we are having to undertake. Of course, that work includes recommending physical activity, but it also includes giving consumers informed choice, which is what they desperately need.
	Part of that informed choice is the ability to differentiate between products. When I embarked on my journey a year ago, I was concerned mainly about the products that present the hardest choices. How can one shepherd's pie or one lasagne be differentiated from another? Many people buy processed products because they lead busy lives, but some may do so because they have no guidance to help them determine whether one shepherd's pie is healthier than the one next to it in the cabinet. Such complex products were an important issue for me, but so were cereals, which are a meal in themselves at breakfast time.
	It is interesting to note the way in which things have moved on as a result of the labelling debate. It must be said that much of that has been initiated by the industry, which now seems to want to put front-of-pack labels on everything from soft drinks to products which, in our view, speak for themselves and do not really need the labels. I am not saying that I am against that, but we were examining what we considered the most difficult area. When we were designing the model with which the agency helped us and which the Government support, we wanted to end up with something that was sound.
	The model had to be sound on a number of fronts. For one thing, it had to provide clear guidance that people understood. During the deliberations of the past year, it has concerned me that many people still find guideline daily amounts difficult to understand. When asked whether they would support action on GDAs, most people say that they would. When asked whether they understand GDA information on a pack, their answers are slightly different. I understand that some of the organisations which, according to my hon. Friend, do not support the FSA model are embarking on a huge campaign to educate the public on GDAs. I am sure that there will be a great deal of money behind that campaign, but perhaps what is most important is to devise a simpler way for people to understand what they are buying and subsequently consuming.
	As a shopper myself, I know how much time I have when going around the stores. I want to see at a glance what is in the various products when I am shopping for my family. It should be borne in mind that there are different GDAs for men and women and for children. It is a complex issue, and some people say that they are not prepared to live or die for it. At the end of our deliberations, the agency said, "If you want GDAs that is okay, but what is really important is clear information about products that contain high levels of salts, sugars and fats. How can we make it easier for people to differentiate between products? How can we make it easier for them to shop?"
	As was pointed out by my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Southend, West, we need to find a way of providing consumers with the best possible information. It is not my job to tell people what to eat, but I think it is part of my responsibility—and the Government's responsibility—to gear information in a way that allows people to make choices for themselves. If we are ever to conquer the problem of rising levels of obesity, families—parents, but also children—must understand labelling. They must be in the driving seat: they must choose health for themselves. As was pointed out in the White Paper "Choosing Health" , we can play our part in Government by taking action on school meals and working with industry to reformulate and provide better choice between foods, but ultimately we will win only when people make the choice for themselves.
	My hon. Friend mentioned significant data relating to the new Sainsbury's labelling, and gave examples. I would add that it is helping people to make informed choices between brands of soup, for instance. That does mean that sales of some products are falling, but product sales of healthier choices are going up. It is interesting that just providing information causes behaviour change. We get a lot of information about our diet and various foods every day, but it is not always clear how much that drives people to make changes in their lives.
	We have agreed with all parties to the debate on the need to commission independent research to evaluate some of the systems that are being promoted and used, to discover which ones change behaviour the most. I hope that we can do that in a spirit of co-operation and that all sides will be prepared to accept the results of that independent research if it proves its worth.
	The evidence is clear that consumers are overwhelmingly in favour of front of pack signpost labelling and they clearly prefer the colour-coded labels, which was borne out by the Which? report published this week. The issue is not good foods or bad foods, but people making informed choices. I am not saying that people should never eat chocolate or cakes—not least because that would make me a bit of a hypocrite—but it is a question of balance. The red, amber and green labels are not about stopping people eating certain foods, but about helping them to achieve that balance. The colours indicate high, medium and low levels of nutrients, not good or bad foods. That is not the language that we are using.
	In every test, formats that did not have a colour element performed significantly worse than those that did. Consumers also wanted some numerical information, but they were less receptive to percentages. Some people find percentages difficult. Some people have English as a second language, and there are various other barriers to understanding information, one of which is time. What information are we evaluating when we stand in front of the freezer cabinet and choose what to put in our trolley or basket for that week? Nine out of 10 consumers said that they found a colour-coded approach very or fairly easy to use and that they could understand it quickly or at a glance. As I have said, consumers also told us that they particularly wanted to see signposts on foods whose nutritional quality is hard to judge, such as ready meals, sandwiches, pizzas, burgers and breakfast cereals.
	Evidence is continuing to emerge as new labelling appears on our shelves and consumers get to use it in their shopping experience. That evidence has informed the agency's work. The FSA carried out many tests and evaluated different models before it reached the recommended approach, which the Government have endorsed. The core principles that the FSA has applied are pragmatic and progressive. They will provide the consumer with consistency and give business the opportunity to tailor their labelling to fit their customers' needs. Sainsbury's has gone for the wheel of health and others have chosen an oblong label on the front of packets.
	As I have said, the approach is not about demonising foods, but helping busy people to assess quickly the nutritional quality of complex foods so that they can make their choices easily. On GDAs, our approach is flexible enough to allow manufacturers and retailers to provide additional information such as calorie content or GDAs if they wish. However, GDAs are not simple to use and the manufacturers will have to produce better arguments if they wish to pursue them instead of colour coding.
	I began work on this matter a year ago, and I welcome the progress that has made. I hope that the Select Committee involvement of my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Southend, West has helped to move things along, but I am delighted that more than one third of the retail sector is committed to schemes that meet the FSA model. Sainsbury and Waitrose are so committed, and Asda and the Co-op will be soon.

Caroline Flint: That is absolutely true. The retailers have been helping us a lot, in other areas of public health, with their understanding of consumer behaviour. Moreover, it is interesting to see how some of the brand products have ended up competing against retailers' products. Finding out what impact that has, in terms of the products that are put in trolleys and taken out of the supermarket, would make an interesting piece of research.
	We need to encourage more retailers to take up the FSA model. We have committed ourselves to the independent research that I mentioned earlier, which I think will keep us engaged with the industry. In addition, we know that Europe is looking closely at what is happening in the UK. The EU has responsibility for legislation on food labelling across Europe, and I know that some of the companies mentioned by my hon. Friend are already making their case there. They want to find out what works, because that is the most factor in this matter.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Adjourned accordingly at twenty-nine minutes to Eleven o'clock.